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CASE COMMENTS
Criminal Law -EVIDENCE-VOICEPRINTS ADMISSIBLE To CORROBORATE
TESTIMONY IDENTIFYING ACCUSED AS ONE WHO HAD MADE FALSE BOMB
THREATS BY TELEPHONE.-Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
The police received two false bomb threats. They taped the two
calls, traced the second one to a telephone booth and apprehended
Joseph Worley nearby. The evidence against Worley consisted of
fingerprint identification by means of prints found on the telephone,
aural identification by the police officer who had received the calls
and expert identification by means of a voiceprint.' The trial court
admitted the voiceprint evidence; the defendant assigned this admis-
sion as error. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding
that "voiceprints were properly admitted to corroborate defendant's
identification by other means."2
The admissibility of aural identification by a lay witness is well
established in Florida,3 but, as the Worley court noted, the admissi-
bility of voiceprint identification by an expert witness was a question
of first impression in the state.4 Historically Florida courts have ad-
mitted into evidence information obtained from innovative scientific
processes. 5 Before the results of a scientific process can be admitted into
evidence two criteria must be met: the process itself must be reliable
1. Voiceprints, or voice spectrograms, are graphical records of vocal energy. Each
person's voice pattern is determined by the size and shape of his vocal cavities (the
mouth, throat cavity, and nasal cavities) and his articulators (the lips, teeth, tongue,
soft palate, and jaw muscles). The theory of the voiceprint is that each person has a
uniquely identifiable voice pattern because of the innumerable combinatorial inter-
actions of different-sized vocal cavities and articulators. See generally Kamine, The Voice-
print Technique: Its Structure and Reliability. 6 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 213 (1969); Note,
The Admissibility of Voiceprint Evidence, 14 S.D.L. REv. 129 (1969).
2. 263 So. 2d at 614.
3. See, e.g., Riner v. State, 176 So. 38 (Fla. 1937), af'd on rehearing, 179 So. 404 (Fla.
1938); Pennington v. State, 107 So. 331 (Fla. 1926); Mack v. State, 44 So. 706 (Fla. 1907);
Weinshenker v. State, 223 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Cason v. State, 211 So.
2d 604 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Simon v. State, 209 So. 2d 682 (Ila. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968).
4. 263 So. 2d at 614.
5. See, e.g., Odom v. State, 109 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1959) (presence of sperm cells);
Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1953) (fingerprints); Touchton v. State, 18 So. 2d
752 (Fla. 1944) (blood alcohol test); Williams v. State, 197 So. 562 (Fla. 1940) (blood-
type matching test); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Stossell, 179 So. 163 (Fla. 1938) (motion picture
film); Riner v. State, 176 So. 38 (Fla. 1937) (ballistics test); Hall v. State, 83 So. 513
(Fla. 1919) (photographs); Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600 (1886) (footprints); Coppolino v.
State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (test to determine presence of drug
previously thought undetectable); Gomien v. State, 172 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (sound recordings).
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enough to be evidentially competent, 6 and the identification witness
who interprets the results must qualify as an expert.7 The qualification
of the expert witness is a case-by-case determination to be made by the
trial court" once the scientific identification process has been judicially
recognized as reliable." The court in Worley, however, was concerned
with the more basic issue of whether voiceprint evidence should be
admitted at all.
The test for the quantum of reliability necessary before a scien-
tific identification process can be admitted as competent evidence is
usually stated to be whether the process is "sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."'1 The trial court had before it two experts in the field of
voiceprint spectrography, Dr. Oscar Tosil and Sergeant Ernest Nash.12
Their credentials were never questioned by the trial or appellate
courts. To support the reliability of voiceprints, Dr. Tosi and Sergeant
Nash testified on controlled experiments with voiceprints conducted
by themselves and others.13
6. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Kaminski v. State, 63 So.
2d 339 (Fla. 1952); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); 2
B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 15.9 (6th ed. 1972).
7. See, e.g., Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 196 So. 472 (Fla. 1940). See generally 2
B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 14.12 (6th ed. 1972); 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 502 (12th
ed. 1955).
8. See Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 196 So. 472 (Fla. 1940); Harvey v. State, 176
So. 439 (Fla. 1937); Foster v. Thornton, 170 So. 459 (Fla. 1936); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. Dees, 48 So. 28 (Fla. 1908); Upchurch v. Barnes, 197 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
9. See Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dis-
missed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (admission of blood
test for poison), in which the court said:
The general rule regarding admission of scientific evidence is: "Where the
evidence is based solely upon scientific tests and experiments, it is essential that
the reliability of the tests and results thereof shall be recognized and accepted by
scientists or that the demonstration shall have passed from the stage of experi-
mentation and uncertainty to that of reasonable demonstrability."
10. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Kaminski v. State,
63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
11. Professor of Audiology and Speech Sciences, Michigan State University.
12. Voiceprint Unit, Michigan State Police Department.
13. 263 So. 2d at 614. Dr. Tosi and Sergeant Nash testified that in experimenting
with more than 34,000 voiceprint comparisons, trained examiners had reliably matched
voices in 98% of the cases. This figure does not mean, however, that voiceprints are
accurate in 98% of all cases; it means that voiceprints are accurate in 98% of all cases
of positive identification. In United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972),
Dr. Tosi's experiments were explained as follows:
While the total reported percentage of false identifications of an unknown
speaker as a known speaker was approximately six percent, and the total per-
centage of failure to identify an unknown speaker as a known speaker was between
ten and twelve percent, these figures do not reflect the full degree of reliability
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The majority viewed the testimony of Dr. Tosi and Sergeant Nash
in the light of the "only five previous appellate decisions nationally"'1
on the issue of voiceprint admissibility. Two cases, State v. Cary 5 and
People v. King, 6 held voiceprints inadmissible because of a lack of
proven scientific reliability. The other three cases, State ex rel. Trim-
ble v. Hedman' 7 United States v. Wright,"" and United States v. Ray-
mond,19 held voiceprints admissible on a limited basis. Emphasizing
established. The examiners were compelled to draw a conclusion in each case,
whether they felt that conclusion to be accurate or not .... [W]hen the cases in
which an examiner expressed uncertainty . . . are deducted from the number of
misidentifications, the margin of error is only about two percent. In an actual
forensic situation, an experienced examiner like Lt. Nash will only make an
identification when he feels a high degree of certainty. For example, out of some
1,250 examinations performed by Nash . . . [he] made only about 180 positive
identifications, eliminated positively about 450 and would not make a definite
decision in the remaining 620 some odd comparisons.
Id. at 643-44 (footnotes omitted).
14. 263 So. 2d at 614. There has, however, been one voiceprint case in Florida
subsequent to the principal case. In Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), the court held that it was not reversible error to admit voiceprints and expert
testimony thereon when there is other substantial evidence to identify the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime.
15. 239 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968), remanded for further testimony, 250 A.2d
15 (N.J. 1969), aff'd, 264 A.2d 209 (N.J. 1970). The superior court held voiceprints
inadmissible at that time because they had not received "general scientific acceptance."
16. 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). The court held that the admission
of voiceprints was reversible error, saying that voiceprints had not been "accepted by
the scientific community" and that the witness was not qualified as an expert. The
witness, Lawrence Kersta, was the inventor of the voiceprint. The court said that the
inventing of a machine that graphically records voices does not necessarily qualify the
inventor as an interpreter of the graphs. Id. at 490.
17. 192 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1971). In determining whether voiceprints can provide
probable cause for the issuance of arrest and search warrants, the court held that
"spectrograms ought to be admissible for the purpose of corroborating voice identifica-
tion by aural means if a sufficient foundation is laid .... " Id. at 441.
18. 37 C.M.R. 447 (U.S.C.M.A. 1967). The court remarked that "[c]ourts have con-
sistently recognized the admissibility of the testimony of experts in areas where there is
neither infallibility of result nor unanimity of opinion .... " Id. at 453. The court limited
its holding by going on to say:
Here, the tape recording of one of the obscene calls and the recording of the
test call made by the accused were both before the court-martial. Each was
played in open court. Since voice identification by ear is fully acceptable in the
courts, the court members could thus determine for themselves the margin of
error, if any, in Mr. Kersta's expert opinion.
id.
19. 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972). After ruling that voiceprints are admissible,
the court limited its holding to the facts of the case, saying:
[T]his Court does not imply that such evidence is mistake-proof or that any
voice identification should be admitted. Our holding, based upon the complete
record before the Court, relying especially on the latest scientific evidence and
the expertise of the individual making the identification, is that the spectrographic
1973]
Florida State University Law Review
that the two adverse decisions were decided prior to many of the im-
portant voiceprint experiments, 20 the Worley court adopted the ration-
ale of the three favorable precedents and hypothesized that "based on
the changes in Dr. Tosi's testimony alone, Cary and King would be
decided differently today. ' ' 21 The issue of whether voiceprints could be
admitted as direct evidence 22 was not before the court because "the
evidence against defendant was already ample to sustain his convic-
tion, even without the use of voiceprints. ' '23 Therefore the decision
must be viewed as admitting voiceprints for corroborative purposes
only.24
In a concurring opinion Judge Mager argued that, because of its
proven reliability, voiceprint identification should be admitted as
direct evidence and that "voiceprint testimony should be no less ad-
missible and no less credible than the testimony of a lay witness or
victim who is permitted to make an identification from merely having
heard the voice of the accused. '" 25
Dissenting, Judge White argued that voiceprints had not yet
reached a state of sufficient scientific reliability to be used as a safe
"mode of proof in a criminal trial."26 He expressed concern over the
statistical validity of Dr. Tosi's experiments2 7 and also over Dr. Tosi's
identification of Albert Raymond was clearly reliable enough to be admitted into
evidence.
Id. at 645.
20. Compare State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn. 1971),
stating that "[a]ll of the articles [challenging the reliability of the voiceprint] mentioned
above were written and State v. Cary . . . [and] People v. King ...were decided prior
to the experiments conducted by Dr. Tosi."
21. 263 So. 2d at 614. In State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680, 683 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968),
remanded for further testimony, 250 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1969), aff'd, 264 A.2d 209 (N.J.
1970), the court stated that Dr. Tosi "was of the opinion that the [voiceprint] tech-
nique has considerable potential as an aid to law enforcement, but before he would
give a firm scientific opinion he felt that further experimentation and testing was
required because of its infancy in the related scientific fields."
22. Direct evidence is "that which if believed proves the existence of the fact in
issue without inference or presumption . I..." 1 E. CONRAD, MODERN TRAIL EvmE.CE § 3,
at 6-7 (1956). See Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1956).
23. 263 So. 2d at 614.
24. The court expressly limited its holding, stating: "The issues not being before
us, we do not decide if voiceprint identification may be employed only for corroboration,
or, if voiceprint identification, standing alone, would be sufficient to sustain the identi-
fication and conviction of the defendant." Id. at 614-15.
25. Id. at 616.
26. Id. at 618.
27. Id. at 617-18. Questioning the sufficiency of the size of Dr. Tosi's test sample,
Judge White stated that "34,000 tests seem a rather negligible number to accept as
proof that no two voices among 333 million [English-speaking] people are alike." Id. at
618.
(Vol. I
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testimony that a mimic might be able to "fool" a voiceprint.2 8
The specific holding in Worley has already been followed by an-
other Florida court.29 Assuming that voiceprinting techniques do not
violate any constitutional 30 or statutory l prohibitions, this decision
28. ld. at 618.
29. Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See note 14 supra.
30. No constitutional issue was before the court in Worley. A recent decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States, United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973), pre-
cludes any possible fifth amendment attack-and severely circumscribes any possible
fourth amendment attack-on the admissibility of voiceprints. In Dionisio twenty wit-
nesses had been subpoenaed before an investigatory grand jury and had been requested
to furnish voice exemplars. Some refused the request, asserting (1) that compelled
submission to a voice exemplar test would violate their fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; (2) that the "dragnet effect" of summoning twenty persons
to furnish voice exemplars was an impermissible "seizure" under the fourth amendment;
and (3) that a voice exemplar test is a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Dionisio v. United States, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
By analogizing voice exemplars to physical characteristics such as fingerprints, stance,
gait and handwriting the Court rejected the fifth amendment argument, and held:
It has long been held that the compelled display of identifiable physical
characteristics infringes no interest protected by the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination.
Wade and Gilbert definitively refute any contention that the compelled pro-
duction of voice exemplars in the case would violate the Fifth Amendment. The
voice recordings were to be used solely to measure the physical properties of the
witnesses' voices, not for the testimonial or communicative content of what was to
be said.
93 S. Ct. at 767-68. Accord, People v. King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1971); State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1968), remanded for further testimony, 250 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1969), afl'd
264 A.2d 209 (N.J. 1970). See also United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); State v. King,
209 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1965).
The Dionisio court also rejected the two fourth amendment arguments by holding
that
neither the summons to appear before the grand jury, nor its directive to make
a voice recording infringed upon any interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, [and thus] there was no justification for requiring the grand jury to satisfy
even the minimal requirements of "reasonableness" . . . .
93 S. Ct. at 772. Accord, United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus Dionisio
rejects any argument that a grand jury summons is to be tested by fourth amendment
principles of probable cause or reasonableness, or that a voice exemplar constitutes a
search. But see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (investigatory seizures by police
for purposes of obtaining fingerprints are subject to the fourth amendment even though
fingerprints themselves are not protected by that amendment); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906) (overbroad subpoena duces tecum compelling production of books and
papers may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the fourth amendment).
Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (external pat down of clothes in a search); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (extraction of blood is a search).
After Dionisio the only sure avenue of fourth amendment attack on the admissibility
of voiceprints would seem to be the case where the defendant was not in custody pur-
suant to a valid arrest or other valid compulsory process at the time he was voice-
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signals the judicial recognition in Florida of a valuable scientific de-
vice which will aid in identifying the guilty while protecting the
innocent.32
Constitutional Law - STATE TAXATION-AIRPORT USE TAXES IMPOSED
ON DEPARTING COMMERCIAL AIRLINE PASSENGERS ONLY AS COMPEN-
SATION FOR USE OF FACILITIES VIOLATE No FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS.-Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
The rapid increase in private and commercial aviation operations'
has necessitated concomitant airport development and expansion. One
method of generating funds for these purposes is the so-called air-
port use tax. Prior to 1972, only Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey and an Indiana airport authority district had actually imposed
such taxes. 2 With slight variations, the tax in each instance took the
printed. In such a situation the voiceprint could be excluded as the "fruit" of a con-
stitutionally impermissible seizure. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
One possible result of Dionisio on the practice of voiceprinting may be that prosecu-
tors will resort to grand jury process to compel the voiceprinting of a suspect in situa-
tions where there is no probable cause to arrest the suspect. Thus a prosecutor could
obtain a desired voiceprint without running the risk of having the results excluded.
See United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 781, 789 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting in Dionisio
and Mara).
31. No statutory violations were at issue in the principal case. But in the case
of a surreptitious voiceprinting, obtained without the consent of the parties involved,
FLA. STAT. § 934.01(4) (1971) may be relevant. It provides in part: "To safeguard the
privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications when none
of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed
only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction .... ".See generally Alea
v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
32. In his concurring opinion, Judge Mager elaborated on the social policies favor-
ing the admission of voiceprints as direct evidence: "Protecting society from those who
have violated the law as well as protecting the one who has been unjustly accused
serves to heighten the need for more sophisticated methods of crime prevention and
crime detection." 263 So. 2d at 616.
1. An "operation" is defined as either a take-off or a landing. Commercial opera-
tions at airports with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control towers increased
by approximately 33%, from 7,819,114 in 1965 to 10,393,294 in 1970. See At TRANSPORT
Ass'N OF AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF U.S. ScnEDULED AIRLINE INDUSTRY 21 (1971). In
1965, there were 26,572,650 general aviation operations and in 1970, 41,384,006-an increase
of approximately 55%. See id.
2. Several other localities-for example, Los Angeles, California; Raleigh-Durham,
North Carolina; Spokane County, Washington; and Hawaii-had proposed but had
declined to adopt similar taxes. Four of the proposed taxes were rejected after legal
